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1. Introduction 
Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, and the breakout of the global financial 
crisis, many affected countries aimed to reduce their public debt stocks by applying 
contractionary fiscal policies. The reason behind this was the escalation in the levels of 
debt amid previously applied countercyclical expansionary policies. There is 
considerable literature on the degree of fiscal budget sustainability, see next section, 
which applies tests for the order of integration of fiscal budget over GDP. However, it is 
important for policy decisions to understand how its components, namely public 
expenditure and revenue over GDP, in addition to the difference between these, react 
after a shock. 
 In this paper we apply fractional integration techniques in order to gain 
flexibility in the analysis of the order of integration of these macrovariables in a group 
of 27 EU countries. As far as we know, this is one of the few papers that analyse this 
issue from a fractionally integrated perspective and the first in the context of the EU 
countries. If the order of integration is greater than 1, then shocks have permanent 
effects, whereas if it is less than 1, the effects are only transitory. In the former, policy 
intervention is necessary to counteract exogenous shocks, whereas in the latter it would 
only depend on the speed of mean reversion, which is faster the closer the order of 
integration is to 1. Given that some EU countries have needed bailouts after the collapse 
of their public balances, the analysis of the mean reversion of fiscal budget and its 
components has gathered momentum. This is of particular importance since, in a 
monetary union, there is no possibility to finance public deficits through monetary 
expansion by the national central banks. Hence the probability of default increases (De 
Grauwe, 2012). 
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 In a seminal contribution, Bohn (2007) explains that the transversality condition 
of the intertemporal budget constraint can be satisfied for any arbitrary order of 
integration of the fiscal deficit, for a sufficiently large discount factor. Hence, one 
cannot really assess sustainability testing for stationarity of the fiscal deficit. In this 
paper, we are interested in analysing how the three magnitudes, i.e. expenditure, 
revenue and the difference between them, over GDP, react after a shock and we call for 
caution in the non-mean reverting cases.  
 The contributions of the paper are the following: First we examine the public 
finances from a time series viewpoint using a novel methodology based on the concepts 
of long memory and fractional integration. In doing so, we permit a more degree of 
flexibility than the standard methods that are based on stationarity, I(0), or 
nonstationarity, I(1), models. Second, there are not empirical papers that use this 
methodology in the context of the 27 EU countries. Finally, the implications of the 
shocks using this method are also examined in the paper.  
There are many different ways to assess sustainability. The S0, S1 and S2 
indicators are another way to assess it. Our measures are complementary to those, in the 
sense that rather than looking at the values of debt, we look at how countries accumulate 
debt. That is, we look into how past flows into the stock of debt affect the speed at 
which does flows generate. In order words, we analyse if the countries generate debt in 
an explosive manner. Hence, the values of debt or public deficits may not be very high, 
but a country might be generating then at a high speed every year, which could be seen 
as an indication that something is wrong. 
 The layout of the paper is as follows: Section 2 deals with a brief revision of the 
literature on this specific issue. Section 3 presents the methodology used in the paper 
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which is based on fractional integration, making especial emphasis in the fact that this 
methodology allows for studying in a more flexible way the nature of the shocks which 
may be transitory or permanent. Section 4 describes the dataset and the results. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review  
Sustainability of fiscal policy has been an issue widely addressed in the literature over 
decades, coming back again to the heart of the debate after the 2008 global financial 
crisis. Initially, the majority of the empirical works1 examine this hypothesis for U.S. 
time series data, either from a univariate approach, testing the non-stationary of budget 
deficits or public debt by applying different unit root tests (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; 
Wilcox, 1989), or from a multivariate approach, assessing the long-run relationship 
between public revenues and expenditures (Trehan and Walsh, 1988; Hakkion and 
Rush, 1991; Haug, 1991, 1995; Ahmed and Rogers, 1995; Quintos, 1995; Crowder, 
1997; Martin, 2000). Other studies attempt to unify both approaches (Trehan and 
Walsh, 1991; Berenguer-Rico and Carrión-i-Silvestre, 2011) or suggest alternative 
methods to test the fiscal sustainability (Bohn, 1998, 2007; Yoon, 2012). We also find 
works that re-examine this issue, highlighting the importance of allowing for structural 
breaks in the analysis (Quintos, 1995; Martin, 2000; Cunado et al., 2004; Berenguer-
Rico and Carrión-i-Silvestre, 2011) or reaching a certain threshold for a mean-reverting 
behaviour of budget deficit (Arestis et al., 2004; Payne and Mohammadi, 2006; 
Cipollini et al., 2009). Examples of empirical literature for other economies are also 
numerous. We can point out single-country studies, for instance, for the case of 
                                                     
1 For a comprehensive literature review, see e.g. Afonso (2005) and Paparas et al. (2015). 
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Australia (Elliot and Kearney, 1988; Olekalns, 2000); the United Kingdom (Lusinyan 
and Thornton, 2011; Fan and Arghyrou, 2012); Spain (Bajo-Rubio et al., 2004, 2006, 
2014); Portugal (Marinheiro, 2006; Correia et al., 2008); Austria (Getzner et al., 2001); 
Germany (Greiner et al., 1999, 2006) or Sweden (Hatemi-J, 2002), among others, as 
well as, for a set of countries such as the G-7 (Payne, 1997; Feve and Henin, 2000; 
Chen, 2014) or some EU/EMU members (Bravo and Silvestre, 2002; Greiner et al., 
2004; Afonso, 2005; Argyrou and Luintel, 2007; Cuestas and Staehr, 2013; Afonso and 
Tovar, 2017). Both the methodology and the main results of such studies are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Focusing on our sample, we can mention some previous works based on EU 
quarterly data which take into account multiple structural changes and the presence of 
nonlinearities in the analysis. For instance, Argyrou and Luintel (2007) examine both 
the strong- and weak-sense of fiscal sustainability for a sample of four EMU economies 
─Greece, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands─ In their research, the authors find 
evidence that the fiscal policy in all of them is sustainable, detecting the presence of 
multiple regime shifts, one of which can be attributed to the Maastricht Treaty. In 
addition, their results point to the existence of a non-linear behavior in the adjustment of 
fiscal disequilibrium. Other authors such as Cuestas & Staehr (2013) study the 
persistence of the fiscal balance in percent of GDP of ten Central and Eastern European 
countries. They find out that in the long term, the series exhibit a mean-reverting 
behavior after controlling for structural changes, but this scenario is vulnerable and 
depend, in the medium term, on the effect of global financial crisis. More recently, Chen 
(2014), using different threshold autoregressive (TAR) models, analyses fiscal 
sustainability of the debt-GDP ratio for the G7 and some European countries ─Greece, 
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Ireland, Portugal and Spain─. Evidence seems to be mixed, depending on the type of 
linear or non-linear unit root tests applied. The results from TAR model show for the 
majority of countries that the government's intertemporal budget constraint holds in the 
long run. The results from variants of TAR model reveal that the debt–GDP ratios of 
Canada, Germany, the US and Italy are stationary when a non-linear trend is considered. 
Finally, Alfonso and Tovar (2017) revisit the relationship between the primary budget 
surplus and the debt–to–GDP ratio using a sample of eleven Euro–area countries over 
the period 1999Q1 and 2013Q4. Their results show evidence of sustainability in 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, highlighting the negative impact of the 
global financial crises on fiscal sustainability. Table 1 summarizes the literature review 
in a comprehensive way. 
[Include Table 1 about here] 
Overall we can say that the evidence is mixed and far from conclusive. The 
contribution of this paper lies in the analysis of the reaction to shocks not only for the 
fiscal deficit, but also for its main components, revenue and expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP. To gain flexibility in the analysis instead of relying on unit root or stationarity 
tests, we use fractional integration methods which break the dichotomy of integer orders 
of integration. In this way we may be able to see whether a potential escalating deficit is 
due to the expenditure side or the revenue side. 
 
3. Methodology 
We use techniques which are based on the concept of fractional integration. This 
basically means that the number of differences required in a time series to render it I(0) 
stationarity may be a fractional value, allowing thus for a higher flexibility in the 
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dynamic specification of the data than those models based on classical methods and that 
only use integer degrees of differentiation, usually 0 or 1. Thus, xt is said to be 
integrated of order d, and denoted as xt ≈ I(d) if it can be represented as: 
        
,...,2,1t,ux)L1( tt
d     (1) 
where L is the lag operator (i.e., Lxt = xt-1), and ut is I(0) (or “short memory”), defined 
as a covariance stationary process where the infinite sum of the autocovariances is 
finite. In this context, if d > 0, xt belongs to a wider class of models called “long 
memory”, so-named because of the strong degree of association between observations 
which are far away in time.  These processes, originally proposed in the 80s by Granger 
(1980, 1981), Granger and Joyeux (1980) and Hosking (1981) garnered popularity 
fifteen years later when its use was generalized in the analysis of macroeconomic and 
financial data (see, e.g. Baillie,1996; Gil-Alana and Robinson, 1997; Michelacci and 
Zaffaroni, 2000). The main advantage of this method is that it is more general than the 
standard methods, in the sense that it includes the standard cases of stationarity, I(0), 
and nonstationarity, I(1), as particular cases of interest when d is equal to 0 and 1 
respectively. Another advantage of this approach is that the fractional differencing 
parameter will provide us with information about the degree of persistence of the data. 
Moreover, this is a very flexible approach that permits us to consider nonstationary 
persistence though mean reverting processes if the differencing parameter is in the range 
[0.5, 1). In this context, the longer the value of d is, the longer the time the series to be 
recovered will be, while if d is equal to or higher than 1 shocks will have a permanent 
nature and strong measures will have to be adopted to recover the original trends. 
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4. Data and Empirical Results 
In this section we describe the dataset and present the results for the fiscal sustainability 
analysis. The database has been obtained from EUROSTAT and corresponds to 
quarterly non-financial accounts for general government. The variables studied are total 
expenditure and total revenue as percentages of gross domestic product. We use 
unadjusted data (i.e. neither seasonally adjusted nor calendar adjusted data) due to their 
greater availability for longer time series. Our sample covers 27 EU countries  over the 
period 1999Q1 2014Q1, for the majority of them.2 We only consider countries that 
have at least 50 observations for each variable, being excluded for this reason, Croatia, 
with 9 observations (from 2012Q1 to 2014Q1).  
Across this section and to allow for some deterministic terms, we consider the 
following model, 
,...,2,1,)1(,  tuxLxty tt
d
tt    (2) 
where the errors are assumed to follow in turn a white noise process. Across the tables 
we display the estimates of d, along with their corresponding 95% confidence bands, for 
the three cases of i) no deterministic terms, ii) a constant, and iii) a constant and a linear 
time trend. Table 2 focuses on the expenditure/GDP ratio (in logs); Table 3 on 
revenue/GDP, while Table 4 on the differences between the two series. 
 Starting with the expenditure/GDP ratio and looking first at the deterministic 
terms, we observe that the time trend is required in half of the countries (14), while for 
                                                     
2 Countries with data from 1999Q1 to 2014Q1 are: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, The Netherlands.    For the remaining countries, the initial period for the analysis is: the United 
Kingdom (1987Q1); Belgium and France (1991Q1); Sweden (1993Q1); Germany, Spain and Cyprus 
(1995Q1); Romania and Finland (1998Q1) and Malta (2000Q1). 
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the thirteen remaining, the intercept seems to be sufficient to describe this component. 
From the fourteen countries where the time trend is required, the time trend coefficient 
is significantly positive in 10 of them, while in four countries, the time trend is found to 
be negative (Bulgaria, Germany, Slovak Republic and Sweden).3 Focusing on the 
estimated values of d, we can look at the second column of Table 5 that reports a 
summary of Tables 2 – 4 focusing exclusively on the selected models according to the 
deterministic terms. We see in this table that long memory (i.e., statistical evidence of d 
> 0) is found in 16 of the countries examined. France, Finland and the UK also display 
large degrees of persistence (with estimates of d respectively of 0.71, 0.69 and 0.64) but 
the unit root null is in these cases rejected in favor of mean reversion (d < 1). At the 
other extreme, we have 6 countries with significantly negative values of d: Italy (-0.50), 
Cyprus (-0.29), Portugal (-0.24) and Bulgaria, Hungary and Malta (-0.16). For the 
remaining countries the I(0) hypothesis cannot be statistically rejected. 
[Insert Tables 2 -5 about here] 
 Next we move to the revenue/GDP ratio. The results for the three cases of no 
terms, an intercept and an intercept with a linear time trend are displayed in Table 2. We 
observe in this table that the intercept is required in 12 countries, while the time trend 
seems to be required in the remaining 15, with 10 positive trends and 5 countries 
showing a negative slope. The estimates of d in this table are substantially smaller than 
in the case of the expenditure/GDP ratio, and we only observe 4 countries displaying 
long memory (d > 0) behavior: Sweden (0.71), Slovak Republic (0.32), and Greece and 
Lithuania (0.23); on the other hand there are eight countries with anti-persistence (d < 0) 
                                                     
3 Note that in the context of fractional integration with d > 0, the time trend coefficient becomes 
irrelevant since it tends to a constant in the long run. 
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behavior, being especially noticeable the cases of Portugal (-0.51), and Romania (-0.50). 
The remaining countries show I(0) behavior. 
Table 3 focuses on the differences between expenditures and revenues (in logs). 
Starting once more with the deterministic terms, we observe three countries with no 
deterministic terms (Bulgaria, Denmark and Estonia); there is a group of 11 countries 
which require an intercept; and the time trend is statistically significant in the remaining 
13 (with 9 positive trends and 4 negative ones). Focusing now on the differencing 
parameter, long memory is found in 15 countries. Large degrees of integration are also 
obtained in the cases of Denmark (0.60) and the UK (0.42) and anti-persistence is only 
found in two countries: Italy (-0.29) and Austria (-0.25). 
 In general it is found that there is no evidence of lack of mean reversion for the 
countries analysed, with a few exceptions. For the cases of Sweden and Denmark, 
although we do not find evidence of explosive or unit root behavior, it is important to 
highlight the slow speed of mean reversion of their fiscal balance, which also may ring 
some alarm bells. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
There has been increasing concern on the sustainability of public deficits in Europe 
amid the global financial crisis and the Great Recession. The background of this 
analysis is related to the fact that some European economies have needed bailouts. 
With the aim of providing more evidence for policy purposes on the issue of 
fiscal sustainability in Europe, we have analyzed the order of integration of public 
expenditure, revenue and the difference between them, over GDP, in Europe. 
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To keep the analysis simple and focused, we have applied fractional integration 
techniques is order to analyze the mean-reverting behavior of those three variables. This 
methodology is more general than the classical one based on integer degrees of 
differentiation and seems to be more appropriate to analyze the nature of the shocks 
from a very flexible viewpoint. We then find that these three variables behave in most 
cases as mean reverting processes, some of them also displaying long memory behavior. 
The main implication is that shocks will tend to disappear by themselves with no need 
of strong policy actions to recover the original trends.  
The possibility of structural breaks is an issue that has not been taken into 
account in this paper. This is relevant, especially noting that some authors have argued 
that fractional integration might be an artificial artifact generated by the presence of 
breaks not taken into account (see, e.g, Diebold and Inoue, 2001; Granger and Hyung, 
2004; etc.). However, given the sample size in our case, the inclusion of breaks would 
produce subsamples with very few observations invalidating the analysis based on 
fractional integration. On the other hand, issues such as causality, endogeneity or the 
omission of relevant variables have not been taken into account in the univariate models 
presented in this work since our approach was based on examining the statistical 
properties from the data following the approach of “let the data speak by themselves”. 
All these questions will be investigated in future papers. 
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Table 1: Summary of some empirical works on fiscal sustainability 
Author(s) State(s) 
Time period 
(frequency) 
Variables Tests performed Sustainability? 
Hamilton & Flavin 
(1986) 
U.S. 
1962–1984  
(annual) 
Deficit &  
debt 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots 
Generalized Flood-Garber test 
Restricted Flood-Garber test 
Yes: consistent with the IBC ( at 10% 
significance level) 
Trehan & Walsh 
(1988) 
U.S. 
1890–1986 
(annual) 
Deficit, tax 
smoothing 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots 
Engle-Granger co-integration test 
Stock-Watson co-integration test 
Barro’s tax smoothing hypothesis  
Yes: consistent with IBC but not with tax 
smoothing hypothesis. 
Wilcox  (1989) U.S. 
1960–1984  
(annual) 
(Un)disco-
unted debt 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots 
F-statistic test 
Hamilton and Flavin test 
No: Fiscal policy has not been sustainable, 
contrary to Hamilton and Flavin (1986) 
Hakkio & Rush 
(1991) 
U.S. 
1950:2–1988:4  
(quarterly) 
Deficit 
ADF unit roots test 
Different co-integration tests 
Yes: for the entire sample. 
No: from 1976:3 to 1988:4 
Haug  (1991) U.S. 
1960:1–1987:4 
(quarterly) 
Debt (bond) 
& Surplus 
The co-integration regression 
Durbin-Watson (CRDW) test 
 ADF unit roots test 
Yes: variables are stationary in first 
differences; co-integration tests imply the 
acceptance of the present value borrowing 
constraint 
Trehan & Walsh 
(1991) 
U.S. 
1960 –1984  
1946 –1987 
(annual) 
Deficit, debt 
& external 
investment 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots 
Phillips' test 
 
Yes: for the federal government's budget, 
the deficit is consistent with sustainability; 
also, for the external investment. 
Ahmed & Rogers 
(1995) 
U.S. & 
U.K. 
1792–1992 
1692–1992 
(annual) 
IBC & IBOC 
Phillips-Perron unit roots test 
Perron unit roots test 
ADF unit roots test 
Co-integration & stability tests 
Yes: in the U.S. and U.K., both constraints 
being satisfied in entire sample. 
Quintos  (1995) U.S. 
1947:2–1992:3 
(quarterly) 
Deficit 
(Breaks) 
Phillips & Ploberger (1994) PIC test 
ADF unit roots test  
Rank constancy test with breaks for 
co-integration (Quintos, 1994) 
Yes: co-integration is a sufficient 
condition in the ‘strict’ sense of 
sustainability and holds only up to 1980.  
Independently of shifts, deficit is 
sustainable. 
Crowder (1997) U.S. 
1950:1–1994:2 
(quarterly) 
IBC 
ADF unit roots test 
Johansen's (1994) method 
No: expenditures grow faster than 
revenues as from 1982; this is in the line 
of Hakkio & Rush (1991), Wilcox (1989) 
& Quintos (1995) 
Payne  (1997) G–7 
1949–1994 
(annual) 
Deficit 
ADF unit roots test 
Engle-Granger co-integrating 
regressions. 
 
Yes: for Germany; for Canada, Italy, U.K. 
& the U.S., the estimated b's are 
significantly less than one. 
No: for France, Japan & Italy. 
It is contrary to Owoye (1995) 
Bohn (1998) U.S. 
1916–1995 
(annual) 
Debt & 
surpluses 
Phillips-Perron test; ADF test; KPSS 
test; different regressions. 
Bohn’s test (relationship between 
primary surpluses & debt ratio) 
Yes: the debt-GDP ratio should be mean-
reverting. IBC holds despite the frequent 
primary deficit. 
Greiner & Semmler 
(1999)  
Germany 
1955–1994 
(annual) 
Discounted 
net debt 
Restricted Flood-Garber Test 
ADF test for unit roots 
AR(2) estimations 
No: in particular, after 1989. 
Martin (2000) U.S. 
1947:2–1992:3 
(quarterly)  as 
Quintos (1995) 
Deficit 
(Breaks) 
Phillips & Ploberger (1994) PIC test 
&ADF unit roots test based on OLS. 
Co-integration with endogenous 
breaks 
 
Yes: over the 1947-1992 period, as in 
Quintos (1995). It is found 3 breaks: 
1975:1, 1985:1, & 1987:1  
Olekalns  (2000) Australia 
1900 – 1994/95 
(annual)  
1978:3 -1997:4 
(quarterly) 
IBC 
(Breaks) 
ADF test 
KPSS test 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) test  
Engle and Granger's (1987) test 
Gregory-Hansen (1996) test 
No: there has not been adherence to the 
IBC but there exist recent budget 
surpluses; it is detected structural shifts in 
fiscal policy at the end of World War II 
and in the 1980s. 
Feve & Henin 
(2000) 
G–7 
1970–1999 
(semi–annual) 
Debt & 
surplus Feedback ADF unit root test Yes: U.S, UK and Japan 
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ADF test 
AR-OLS test 
No: Germany, France, Italy, Canada. 
Getzner et al. (2001) Austria 
1960–1999 
(annual) 
Debt & 
surplus 
Generalized Flood-Garber test 
Restricted Flood–Garber test 
ADF test 
ARMA processes 
Bohn (1998) test 
Yes: stationarity from 1960 to 1974.  
No: non-stationarityfrom 1975 to 1999. 
Thus, structural break in the mid-1970s. 
Hatemi–J  (2002) Sweden 
1963:1–2000:1 
(quarterly) 
Taxes & 
spending 
KPSS test 
Perron (1989) test 
Johansen’s VAR 
Augmented Granger causality tests 
Yes: consistent with the IBC and feasible 
with respect to the EMU criteria (bi–
directional causality) 
Bravo & Silvestre 
(2002) 
11-EU 
1960–2000 
(annual) 
Expenditures 
& revenues 
Dickey– Fuller stationarity tests 
Engle– Granger cointegration test 
Johansen cointegration trace test 
The t-statistic test (b=1) 
Yes: in Austria, France, Germany, 
Netherlands and the UK. 
No: in Belgian, Denmark, Ireland, 
Portugal, Italy & Finland. 
Cunado et al. (2004) U.S. 
1947:2–2003:1 
(quarterly) 
Deficit 
(Breaks) 
Fractional processes with breaks: 
Robinson (1994) Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test 
Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimate 
of Robinson (1995) test (QMLE) 
Yes: fiscal deficit is mean reverting                  
(an I(d) process with d<1) taking into 
account a break in the mid-1970s. 
Arestis et al. (2004) U.S. 
1947:2– 2002:1 
(quarterly) 
Surplus 
(Breaks) 
Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) 
model by Caner & Hansen (2001) 
Yes: in the long run. Intervention to 
reduce the deficit only when a certain 
threshold (-0.313) is reached. 
Bajo–Rubio et al. 
(2004) 
Spain 
1964–2001 
(annual) 
Surplus 
Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) 
model by Caner & Hansen (2001) 
Yes: evidence of mean-reverting of 
deficit once a threshold (-1.90) is reached. 
Greiner et al. (2004) 4-EMU 
1960–2003 
(annual) 
Debt & 
surplus 
Bohn’s (1998) test 
OLS estimations 
Yes: for all economies (France 
Germany, Italy & Portugal) 
Bohn (2005) U.S. 
1792-2003 
(annual) 
Debt &  
deficit 
ADF test; PP test; & KPSS test. 
Regression specification obtained 
from tax smoothing theories. 
Yes: robust positive response of primary 
surpluses to fluctuations in the debt-GDP 
ratio. Link with economic growth. 
Afonso (2005) 15-EU 
1970–2003 
(annual) 
Debt 
(Breaks) 
ADF and PP test 
Zivot and Andrews's (1992) test  
Engle-Granger and Johansen  
cointegration tests 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
cointegration test (regime shift) 
No, for the majority of EU-15 countries, 
despite of signs of stabilizing of debt-to-
GDP ratio at the end of the 1990s. Only 
Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Austria, and the U.K show signs of 
sustainability. 
Payne & 
Mohammadi (2006) 
U.S. 
1947:1–2003:4 
(quarterly) 
Deficit 
(Breaks) 
TAR model  
 Momentum TAR model (MTAR) 
Yes: allowing for an endogenously 
structural break in 1982:1.  
Deficit shows symmetric mean-reverting 
behaviour around the threshold value. 
Bajo-Rubio et al. 
(2006) 
Spain 
1964 –2003 
(annual) 
1982:1–2004:1 
(quarterly) 
Expenditures 
& revenues 
Ng–Perron (2001) tests of unit roots 
Hansen–Seo (2002) tests of threshold 
cointegration 
Yes: mean-reverting dynamic behaviour 
after threshold: 5.30% of GDP for annual 
data and 7%, for quarterly data. The main 
consolidation effort was at the end of the 
first half of the 80s, and 1993–95. 
Marinheiro (2006) Portugal 
1852–2003 
(annual) 
Debt &  
deficit  
(Breaks) 
ADF test; PP test; & KPSS test. 
Engle and Granger test 
Johansen maximum likelihood test 
Gregory and Hansen test 
Yes: for 1903–2003. 
No: for 1975–2003.  
Fiscal policy is unsustainable since 1975. 
Greiner et al. (2006)  Germany 
 1960–2003 
(annual) 
Debt & 
Surplus 
 Semi-parametric regressions with 
time depending coefficients as an 
extension of Bohn’s (1998) approach. 
 Yes: public debt is sustainable as in 
Greiner et al. (2004). 
Argyrou & Luintel 
(2007) 
4-EMU: 
Greece 
Italy 
Ireland & 
Netherland 
1970:1-1998:3 
1962:2-1997:4 
1957:1-1998:4 
(quarterly) 
Expenditures 
& revenues 
(Breaks) 
 DOLS and DGLS estimators of the 
co-integrating vector. 
 Tests for non-linear fiscal 
adjustment 
Yes: for all 4 economies, across different 
time horizons (Maastricht effect) 
Correia et al. (2008) Portugal 
1852–2004 
(annual) 
Expenditures 
& revenues 
(Breaks) 
ADF test & PP test. 
Cointegration tests (Johansen & 
Saikkonen and Lütkepohl) 
Breitung’s non-parametric test  
Yes: for 1923–1973 and since 1986. 
No:  for 1852–1922 and 1974–1985.  
Breitung test and the Bohn test (based on 
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Bohn’s test theoretical model) are useful to detecting 
unsustainability. 
Cipollini et al. 
(2009) 
U.S. 
1947:1–2004:4 
(quarterly) 
Expenditures 
& revenues 
(Breaks) 
ADF test & PP test. 
Ng & Perron (2001) under GLS 
Lagrange multiplier threshold test. 
Berkowitz (2001) test 
Yes: in the long run. Intervention to reduce 
the deficit only when a threshold ($8.859 
per capita) is reached. Fiscal adjustments 
take place via spending cuts. Major shifts: 
feb-1975, mar-1981, feb-1999 
Berenguer-Rico & 
Carrion-i-Silvestre 
(2011) 
U.S. 
1947:1–2007:3 
(quarterly) as in 
Quintos (1995), 
Martin (2000) & 
Cunado et al., 
(2004) 
Debt &  
deficit  
(Breaks) 
Unified 
framework 
Perron–Yabu (2009) test 
Gregory and Hansen test  
Carrion-i-Silvestre and Sansó test. 
Estimation of the multicointegration 
and I(2) cointegration regressions 
Yes: there is a long-run stock–flow 
relationship between revenues and 
expenditures with one break by the mid-
1990s (1995:4 or 1996:4, depending on 
the model) 
Lusinyan & 
Thornton (2011) 
U.K. 
1750–2004 
(annual) as in 
Ahmed & 
Rogers (1995). 
Expenditures 
& revenues 
(Breaks) 
Different unit roots tests. 
Different cointegration tests: 
 -Gregory and Hansen (1996) test 
 -Johansen (1988, 1991, 1995) test 
 -Johansen et al., (2000) test 
Yes: strong evidence of a long-run 
relationship between revenues and 
expenditures; some of the main 
breakpoints are linked to war events. 
Yoon (2012) U.S. 
1947:1–2007:3 
(quarterly) as in 
Berenguer-Rico 
& Carrion-i-
Silvestre (2011) 
Deficit 
(Breaks) 
ADF test 
Recursive ADF test suggested by 
Phillips et al. (2011) for explosiveness 
Yes: the post-war U.S. budget deficit 
was explosive. This work should be 
studied again taking into account a new 
version of recursive test for multiple 
episodes of explosiveness. 
Fan & Arghyrou 
(2012) 
U.K. 
1955:1–2006:1 
(quarterly) 
Expenditures 
& revenues 
(Breaks) 
ADF test and PP test. 
DOLS and DGLS estimators of the 
co-integrating vector. 
ECM estimations 
Bai & Perron (1998) test. 
QL-STECM test 
Yes: for the full time sample and 
subperiods identified, with 3 breaks in the 
early 1970s & 1980s and late 1990s. 
No: from 1973 to 1981. 
Cuestas & Staehr 
(2013) 
10-EU 
(Central & 
Eastern) 
1999:1 –2010:2  
(quarterly) 
Budget 
balance in % 
of GDP 
(Breaks) 
Ng–Perron (2001), KSS & Sollis 
(2009) unit root test.  
Lee & Strazicich (2003) unit root test 
Yes: in the long run, the series seem to be 
mean-reverting, after controlling for 
structural changes, but they also exhibit 
instability. 
Bajo-Rubio et al. 
(2014) 
Spain 
1850–2000 
(annual) 
Debt, surplus, 
expenditures 
& revenues 
 
Ng–Perron tests for unit roots. 
Sims–Stock–Watson (1990) tests for 
Granger-causality. 
The impulse-response functions. 
Yes: from 1850 to 2000. Intervention is 
needed if the deficit is over a threshold 
(around 4.5% of GDP, according to Bajo-
Rubio et al., 2010). The resuts support 
Escario et al. (2012); Tortella (2000) or 
Comín (1995, 1996). 
Chen (2014) 
G-7 & 
Greece, 
Ireland, 
Portugal 
& Spain 
1980:1–2012:4 
(quarterly) 
Debt 
imbalance 
Linear unit root tests. 
TAR and MTAR unit root tests. 
LSTR-TAR and LSTR-MTAR unit 
root tests. 
Yes: in the long run (for TAR and MTAR) 
Afonso & Tovar 
(2017) 
11-EMU  
1999:1– 2013:4 
(quarterly) 
Debt & 
surplus 
Different unit root tests. 
Johansen–Juselius cointegration test. 
Stock–Watson–Shins test. 
Toda & Yamamoto (1995) for 
Granger causality test. 
Impulse response functions 
Yes: in Belgium, France, Germany, & the 
Netherlands. Strong importance of 
expenditure‐based fiscal rules 
Notes:   
-Intertemporal Government Budget Constraint (IBC) 
-Intertemporal External Borrowing Constraints (IBOC) 
-EMU: European Monetary Union 
-ADF test: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) test for the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
-PP test: Phillips and Perron (1988) test for the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. 
-KPSS test: Kwiatowski et al. (1992) test for stationarity. 
-KSS: Kapetanios, Shin, and Snell (2003) for unit root in the nonlinear STAR framework 
-Zivot-Andrews (1992) tests for the null hypothesis of a unit root (and exogenous change) 
-Engle-Granger (1987) test of the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
-Johansen (1988) maximum likelihood (LM) test  
-Gregory and Hansen (1996) test specifies the null hypothesis of non-cointegration 
-Carrion-i-Silvestre and Sansó (2006) test, the null is cointegration with one structural break. 
-DOLS: Dynamic Ordinary Least Square 
-DGLS: Generalized Least Squares 
-QL-STECM: quadratic-logistic smooth threshold error correction model 
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Table 2: Estimates of d and 95% confidence band on Expenditure/GDP ratio 
Country No regressors An intercept A linear trend 
U. K. 0.94  (0.82,  1.10) 0.64   (0.56,  0.76) 0.62   (0.52,  0.75) 
AUSTRIA 0.94   (0.78,  1.17) 0.06   (-0.07,  0.26) 0.07   (-0.07,  0.27) 
BELGIUM 0.97   (0.84,  1.14) 0.42   (0.35,  0.53) 0.42   (0.35,  0.53) 
BULGARIA 0.89   (0.74,  1.11) -0.07  (-0.20,  0.12) -0.16 
- 
(-0.31,  0.07) 
CYPRUS 0.82   (0.70,  0.98) 0.12   (0.04,  0.23) -0.29
+ 
(-0.40, -0.12) 
CZECH REP. 0.92   (0.77,  1.14) 0.09   (-0.04,  0.25) 0.08   (-0.05,  0.26) 
DENMARK 0.93   (0.78,  1.16) 0.49   (0.38,  0.63) 0.46   (0.34,  0.62) 
ESTONIA 0.90   (0.75,  1.12) 0.36   (0.26,  0.50) 0.33   (0.21,  0.49) 
FINLAND 0.93   (0.78,  1.14) 0.69   (0.58,  0.87) 0.66   (0.52,  0.86) 
FRANCE 0.96   (0.84,  1.13) 0.70   (0.58,  0.85) 0.71
+
  (0.60,  0.86) 
GERMANY 0.87   (0.74,  1.05) 0.11   (0.01,  0.24) 0.05
-
  (-0.09,  0.31) 
GREECE 0.87   (0.72,  1.08) 0.21   (0.12,  0.33) 0.03
+
  (-0.08,  0.18) 
HUNGARY 0.93   (0.77,  1.16) -0.11  (-0.23,  0.11) -0.16
+
 (-0.31,  0.07) 
IRELAND 0.90   (0.73,  1.14) 0.44   (0.36,  0.56) 0.33
+
   (0.19,  0.51) 
ITALY 0.90   (0.75,  1.11) -0.06  (-0.16,  0.08) -0.50 
+
(-0.63, -0.31) 
LATVIA 0.89   (0.74,  1.11) 0.16   (0.05,  0.31) 0.15   (0.02,  0.32) 
LITHUANIA 0.90   (0.74,  1.13) 0.25   (0.14,  0.41) 0.26   (0.14,  0.42) 
LUXEMBOURG 0.92   (0.76,  1.14) 0.24   (0.11,  0.45) 0.15
+
   (-0.02,  0.41) 
MALTA 0.89   (0.73,  1.11) -0.16  (-0.30,  0.04) -0.14   (-0.28,  0.06) 
NETHERLANDS 0.93   (0.77,  1.16) 0.48   (0.39,  0.54) 0.38
+
   (0.24,  0.55) 
POLAND 0.91   (0.76,  1.14) 0.18   (-0.01,  0.45) 0.20   (0.01,  0.49) 
PORTUGAL 0.90   (0.76,  1.12) 0.12   (0.04,  0.24) -0.24
+
  (-0.38,  -0.04) 
ROMANIA 0.93   (0.76,  1.17) 0.12   (-0.01,  0.36) 0.11   (-0.03,  0.36) 
SLOVAK REP. 0.93   (0.78,  1.14) 0.40   (0.31,  0.54) 0.36
-
 (0.25,  0.52) 
SLOVENIA 0.87   (0.72,  1.05) 0.23   (0.12,  0.38) 0.19
+
  (0.08,  0.34) 
SPAIN 0.88   (0.75,  1.06) 0.16   (0.09,  0.27) 0.13   (0.04,  0.24) 
SWEDEN 0.94   (0.81,  1.12) 0.41   (0.29,  0.57) 0.42
-
  (0.29,  0.60) 
In bold the significant models according to the deterministic terms. +/- in the last column indicates 
significant positive/negative trend coefficients. 
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Table 3: Estimates of d and 95% confidence band on Revenues/GDP ratio 
Country No regressors An intercept A linear trend 
U. K. 0.93   (0.83,  1.07) 0.10   (0.04,  0.18) 0.03
+
  (-0.04,  0.13) 
AUSTRIA 0.90   (0.75,  1.11) -0.18  (-0.26, -0.08) -0.28
-
  (-0.39,  -0.16) 
BELGIUM 0.88   (0.78,  1.03) -0.38  (-0.44, -0.31) -0.47
+
  (-0.53,  -0.40) 
BULGARIA 0.97   (0.80,  1.22) 0.11  (-0.01,  0.30) -0.18
-
   (-0.36,  0.13) 
CYPRUS 0.88   (0.75,  1.06) 0.222   (0.14,  0.32) -0.01
+
  (-0.10,  0.15) 
CZECH REP. 0.93   (0.77,  1.15) 0.03   (-0.11,  0.22) 0.03   (-0.10,  0.21) 
DENMARK 0.93   (0.75,  1.16) 0.12   (-0.05,  0.39) 0.12   (-0.05,  0.41) 
ESTONIA 0.91   (0.75,  1.13) 0.22   (0.12,  0.36) 0.08
+
  (-0.06,  0.28) 
FINLAND 0.96   (0.79,  1.19) -0.18  (-0.31,  0.06) -0.18   (-0.31,  0.05) 
FRANCE 0.93   (0.81,  1.10) -0.12  (-0.20, -0.04) -0.24
+
  (-0.31,  -0.13) 
GERMANY 0.94   (0.80,  1.13) -0.06  (-0.12,  0.03) -0.16
-
  (-0.23,  -0.05) 
GREECE 0.88   (0.74,  1.08) 0.23   (0.14,  0.37) 0.23   (0.13,  0.37) 
HUNGARY 0.92   (0.76,  1.14) 0.11   (0.01,  0.26) -0.06
+
  (-0.19,  0.15) 
IRELAND 0.96   (0.78,  1.22) -0.29  (-0.42, -0.09) -0.30   (-0.44, -0.09) 
ITALY 0.87   (0.73,  1.07) -0.22  (-0.31, -0.12) -0.47
+
  (-0.57,  -0.34) 
LATVIA 0.94   (0.78,  1.18) 0.13   (-0.02,  0.35) 0.13   (-0.02,   0.36) 
LITHUANIA 0.93   (0.76,  1.15) 0.21   (0.09,  0.37) 0.23
-
  (0.11,   0.39) 
LUXEMBOURG 0.94   (0.78,  1.16) 0.09  (-0.03,  0.26) 0.09   (-0.03,   0.26) 
MALTA 0.89   (0.73,  1.10) 0.03  (-0.08,  0.17) -0.08
+
   (-0.18,  0.08) 
NETHERLANDS 0.95   (0.78,  1.19) -0.12   (-0.11,  0.11) -0.12
+
   (-0.23,  0.03) 
POLAND 1.06   (0.87,  1.35) -0.22  (-0.47,  0.34) -0.21   (-0.51,  0.44) 
PORTUGAL 0.88   (0.73,  1.09) -0.10  (-0.19,  0.03) -0.51
+
  (-0.64,  -0.33) 
ROMANIA 0.93   (0.76,  1.17) -0.50  (-0.66, -0.22) -0.50   (-0.66,  -0.22) 
SLOVAK REP. 0.92   (0.77,  1.13) 0.38   (0.30,  0.50) 0.32
-
   (0.20,  0.47) 
SLOVENIA 0.92   (0.76,  1.13) 0.02   (-0.10,  0.18) 0.01   (-0.10,  0.15) 
SPAIN 0.95   (0.82,  1.15) 0.01 (-0.11,  0.20) 0.00   (-0.12,  0.20) 
SWEDEN 0.95   (0.83,  1.13) 0.71   (0.60,  0.85) 0.71   (0.62,  0.85) 
In bold the significant models according to the deterministic terms. +/- in the last column indicates 
significant positive/negative trend coefficients. 
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Table 4: Estimates of d and 95% bands on Expenditures – Revenues (in logs) 
Country No regressors An intercept A linear trend 
U. K. 0.41   (0.34,  0.51) 0.42   (0.35,  0.52) 0.41   (0.34,  0.51) 
AUSTRIA -0.09  (-0.16,  0.02) -0.13  (-0.24,  0.02) -0.25
+
  (-0.41,  -0.04) 
BELGIUM -0.05  (-0.12,  0.04) -0.04  (-0.09,  0.03) -0.06
-
  (-0.11,  0.01) 
BULGARIA -0.05  (-0.18,  0.15) -0.05  (-0.18,  0.15) -0.10  (-0.23,  0.11) 
CYPRUS 0.13   (0.02,  0.27) 0.13   (0.02,  0.27) 0.13   (0.02,  0.27) 
CZECH REP. 0.21   (0.02,  0.43) 0.16   (0.01,  0.37) 0.13   (-0.04,  0.35) 
DENMARK 0.60   (0.49,  0.75) 0.58   (0.48,  0.72) 0.57   (0.46,  0.72) 
ESTONIA 0.09   (-0.05,  0.32) 0.09   (-0.06,  0.32) 0.10   (-0.06,  0.33) 
FINLAND 0.31   (0.18,  0.53) 0.29   (0.17,  0.50) 0.16
+
   (0.02,  0.44) 
FRANCE 0.01   (-0.07,  0.10) 0.01   (-0.06,  0.09) 0.00  (-0.06,  0.09) 
GERMANY 0.10   (0.05,  0.27) 0.08   (0.04,  0.23) 0.12
-
   (-0.03,  0.36) 
GREECE 0.14   (0.06,  0.29) 0.23   (0.11,  0.41) 0.01
+
   (0.22,  0.31) 
HUNGARY 0.18   (0.05,  0.37) 0.16   (0.05,  0.33) 0.10   (-0.03,  0.30) 
IRELAND 0.43   (0.32,  0.57) 0.43   (0.34,  0.55) 0.32
+
   (0.19,  0.50) 
ITALY -0.11  (-0.16, -0.03) -0.24  (-0.35, -0.07) -0.29
+
  (-0.43, -0.10) 
LATVIA 0.07   (-0.04,  0.24) 0.08  (-0.04,  0.24) 0.06  (-0.07,  0.24) 
LITHUANIA 0.27   (0.16,  0.43) 0.29   (0.18,  0.44) 0.26   (0.13,  0.43) 
LUXEMBOURG 0.24   (0.11,  0.42) 0.21   (0.09,  0.37) 0.09
+
   (-0.06,  0.30) 
MALTA 0.19   (0.03,  0.37) 0.11   (0.00,  0.23) -0.04
-
   (-0.16,  0.12) 
NETHERLANDS 0.31   (0.18,  0.52) 0.34   (0.21,  0.55) 0.26
+
   (0.09,  0.51) 
POLAND 0.01   (-0.11,  0.29) 0.01   (-0.25,  0.39) 0.07   (-0.23,  0.51) 
PORTUGAL 0.08   (0.00,  0.24) 0.12   (0.00,  0.30) 0.06
+
   (-0.11,  0.27) 
ROMANIA 0.20   (0.09,  0.37) 0.21   (0.10,  0.38) 0.20   (0.08,  0.38) 
SLOVAK REP. 0.58   (0.43,  0.78) 0.47   (0.33,  0.70) 0.47   (0.32,  0.70) 
SLOVENIA 0.21   (0.09, 0.36) 0.21   (0.09, 0.36) 0.17
+
   (0.05, 0.32) 
SPAIN 0.36   (0.28,  0.45) 0.37   (0.31,  0.46) 0.36   (0.28,  0.45) 
SWEDEN 0.69   (0.58,  0.86) 0.60   (0.50,  0.77) 0.62
-
   (0.52,  0.79) 
In bold the significant models according to the deterministic terms. +/- in the last column indicates 
significant positive/negative trend coefficients. 
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Table 5: Summary estimates of d for the three series 
Country Exp / GDP Rev / GDP Exp - Rev 
U. K. 0.64   (0.56,  0.76) 0.03
+
  (-0.04,  0.13) 0.42   (0.35,  0.52) 
AUSTRIA 0.06   (-0.07,  0.26) -0.28  (-0.39,  -0.16) -0.25  (-0.41,  -0.04) 
BELGIUM 0.42   (0.35,  0.53) -0.47  (-0.53,  -0.40) -0.06  (-0.11,  0.01) 
BULGARIA -0.16 
 
(-0.31,  0.07) -0.18   (-0.36,  0.13) -0.05  (-0.18,  0.15) 
CYPRUS -0.29
 
(-0.40, -0.12) -0.01  (-0.10,  0.15) 0.13   (0.02,  0.27) 
CZECH REP. 0.09   (-0.04,  0.25) 0.03   (-0.11,  0.22) 0.16   (0.01,  0.37) 
DENMARK 0.49   (0.38,  0.63) 0.12   (-0.05,  0.39) 0.60   (0.49,  0.75) 
ESTONIA 0.36   (0.26,  0.50) 0.08  (-0.06,  0.28) 0.09   (-0.05,  0.32) 
FINLAND 0.69   (0.58,  0.87) -0.18  (-0.31,  0.06) 0.16   (0.02,  0.44) 
FRANCE 0.71  (0.60,  0.86) -0.24  (-0.31,  -0.13) 0.01   (-0.06,  0.09) 
GERMANY 0.05  (-0.09,  0.31) -0.16  (-0.23,  -0.05) 0.12   (-0.03,  0.36) 
GREECE 0.03  (-0.08,  0.18) 0.23   (0.14,  0.37) 0.01   (0.22,  0.31) 
HUNGARY -0.16 (-0.31,  0.07) -0.06  (-0.19,  0.15) 0.16   (0.05,  0.33) 
IRELAND 0.33  (0. 19,  0.51) -0.29  (-0.42, -0.09) 0.32   (0.19,  0.50) 
ITALY -0.50 (-0.63, -0.31) -0.47  (-0.57,  -0.34) -0.29  (-0.43, -0.10) 
LATVIA 0.16   (0.05,  0.31) 0.13   (-0.02,  0.35) 0.08  (-0.04,  0.24) 
LITHUANIA 0.25   (0.14,  0.41) 0.23  (0.11,   0.39) 0.29   (0.18,  0.44) 
LUXEMBOURG 0.15   (-0.02,  0.41) 0.09  (-0.03,  0.26) 0.09   (-0.06,  0.30) 
MALTA -0.16  (-0.30,  0.04) -0.08   (-0.18,  0.08) -0.04   (-0.16,  0.12) 
NETHERLANDS 0.38   (0.24,  0.55) -0.12   (-0.23,  0.03) 0.26   (0.09,  0.51) 
POLAND 0.18   (-0.01,  0.45) -0.22  (-0.47,  0.34) 0.01   (-0.25,  0.39) 
PORTUGAL -0.24 (-0.38,  -0.04) -0.51  (-0.64,  -0.33) 0.06   (-0.11,  0.27) 
ROMANIA 0.12   (-0.01,  0.36) -0.50  (-0.66, -0.22) 0.21   (0.10,  0.38) 
SLOVAK REP. 0.36 (0.25,  0.52) 0.32   (0.20,  0.47) 0.47   (0.33,  0.70) 
SLOVENIA 0.19  (0.08,  0.34) 0.02   (-0.10,  0.18) 0.17   (0.05, 0.32) 
SPAIN 0.16   (0.09,  0.27) 0.01 (-0.11,  0.20) 0.37   (0.31,  0.46) 
SWEDEN 0.42  (0.29,  0.60) 0.71   (0.60,  0.85) 0.62   (0.52,  0.79) 
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